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Brain Gym® is a controversial, exercise-based intervention designed to improve academic performance 
in children (Ritchie, Chudler & Della Sala, 2012). On the Brain Gym® web site, there is a section that 
states that they do not use randomised controlled trials (RCTs) to check its efficacy because they 
“question the ethics of not offering equal opportunities to all participants” (Brain Gym® International, 
2011). However: regardless of how confident we are in the treatment – penicillin or Brain Gym® - RCTs 
are an inescapable means to figure out whether an intervention is efficacious or not. Furthermore, the 
main tenet behind RCTs is that they should be double-blind, meaning that neither the participants nor 
the experimenters know who is assuming the real compound and who the placebo.  
 
This is certainly the case for drugs supposed to alleviate the symptoms of dementia. These drugs stand 
on years of development, research, phases of trials, assessment and analysis. The final phase of this 
research is based on the outcome of cognitive tests. If a treatment proves effective, it finds a place on 
chemistry shelves. 
 
Recently, research revealed that drinking chocolate could be added to the list of treatments for 
dementia. Chocolate is a good source of flavonoids, naturally occurring compounds which have been 
associated with a staggering list of health benefits, from reducing the risk of cancer to increasing 
neuronal strength and connectivity.  
 
In 2012, Desideri and colleagues investigated the effect of flavanol – as administered through “dairy-
based cocoa drinks” – on cognitive function in patients at risk of dementia using a double-blind RCT. 
The result was a positive, dose-dependent effect of flavanols on some measures of executive function, 
all of which was packaged to represent positive changes in cognition.  
 
The finding naturally found its way into the popular press, which was keen to report the excellent news 
that chocolate was scientifically proven to “halt dementia” (Willey, 2012). It was especially excellent 
news for Mars Inc., who funded the study and provided the dairy-based cocoa drinks. By capturing a 
beneficial effect of its product, this company could capitalise on the dementia epidemic.  
 
 
[Figure 1] 
 
The hunt for significant and positive outcomes for a product draws out the insidious bias of industry 
funding on study outcome. Specifically, a study that is funded by the same industry that creates the 
product under assessment is more likely to report positive and larger effect outcomes in its favour than 
studies carried without such funding.  
 
In perspective, this bias might not be a severe cause for concern in the case of drinking chocolate. 
However, what if the same position is taken by an industry that could have serious implications for 
treatment or economical consequences for the health service?  
 
We revealed this pattern of results for studies assessing donepezil, which is routinely prescribed as 
treatment for mild to moderate cases of Alzheimer’s Disease (AD). Here, industry-funded, double-
blinded RCTs that reported the effect of donepezil on cognitive measures, such as the Mini Mental State 
Examination (MMSE) or Alzheimer's Disease Assessment Scale-cognitive subscale (ADAS-cog), 
revealed, on average, a larger effect of the drug than the independent studies did (Killin, Russ, Starr, 
Abrahams & Della Sala, 2014). This difference remained after controlling for different study lengths.  
 
[Figure 2] 
 
Our finding is not a one-off. The bias of funding is the ubiquitous bad penny of pharmaceutical trials 
and intervention studies, and has been for some time. A 2003 review commented that an estimated 23-
28% of biomedical researchers were thought to receive funding from the industry, and 34% of studies 
published in 1993 in major medical journals had such researchers as lead authors (Bekelman, Li & 
Gross, 2003). The consequence of this is apparent: Lundh, Sismondo, Lexchin, Busuioc and Bero (2012) 
reported that clinical trials funded by pharmaceutical companies were more likely to reveal a positive 
outcome for treatment over placebo than independent trials. In nutritional trials, health effects of non-
alcoholic drinks were successfully revealed at a rate of 63% in non-industry intervention studies, which 
pales in contrast to the 100% success rate purported by industry-funded research (Lesser, Ebbeling, 
Goozner, Wypil & Ludwig, 2007).  
 
 
The worst of this bias comes when it is not separated or acknowledged in bodies of evidence like meta-
analyses or systematic reviews. In this case, a quantitative meta-analysis collates all observations of a 
product’s effect under some particular situation – like double-blinded RCTs – to give an average 
indication of its effect over a placebo or control, independently of funding sources.  
 
When independent and industry-funded studies are amalgamated into a single effect the combined 
effect is, at best, slightly altered; at worst, entirely misleading. Cataldo, Prochaska and Glantz (2010) 
teased apart the significant risk factor of tobacco on AD reported by independent studies away from the 
null – even protective – effects reported by the tobacco industry’s research. The contrasting stories that 
these data provide meant that “if one simply combined all 43 studies in a single random effects meta-
analysis, one would obtain an inaccurate null result,” (Cataldo et al., 2010, p. 5), implying that tobacco 
smoke was not a risk factor for AD. 
 
[Figure 3] 
 
The proof and prevalence of this bias inspires scepticism for any data pushed by a group that could 
profit from convincing you their product works. This is not restricted to hard health data. Psychology 
studies house evidence for a plethora of educational or generic cognitive training interventions, and the 
chance of funding bias still looms. 
 
A recent case in point is Cogmed, which is a brain-training programme that claims to exploit the 
plasticity of neural working memory systems to improve learning difficulties associated with Attention 
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). Recently, it has drawn particular ire from parents and 
unimpressed psychologists (Colby, 2014). These sentiments echoed a lacklustre review that concluded 
it may, at best, be “possibly efficacious” given that it was often contrasted with poor or inadequate 
control groups (Chacko et al., 2013a). Further criticism came from evidence of its limited effect on 
general working memory abilities and failure to improve parent-reported ADHD symptoms (Chacko et 
al., 2013b). These claims, however, contrast clearly with earlier studies funded by and written by 
authors with shares in Cogmed (Klingberg et al., 2005; Klingberg, 2012).  
 
Back to Brain Gym®: it is worth stressing that the positive data reported may represent vested interests. 
As laid out plainly by Spaulding, Mostert and Beam (2010), the majority of the evidence detailing Brain 
Gym®’s efficacy was published in either the Brain Gym® Journal or the Brain Gym® Magazine. 
When assessed formally by means of a systematic review, there was no evidence from peer-reviewed 
journals to suggest Brain Gym® worked, or that these studies had employed sound methods (Hyatt, 
2007; Ritchie et al., 2012).  
 
These shortcomings are not specific to Cogmed or Brain Gym®, but rather serve as examples of the 
general attitude towards the brain training industry. As raised by Owen et al. (2010) and Thompson et 
al. (2013), brain training produces improvement on the training exercise used in the experiment, but 
does not result in any statistically significant transfer to other skills.  
 
Cynically, we may not be so surprised. Scientifically, though, we should be puzzled. How does this bias 
persevere even after studies are put through the wringer of double-blinded RCTs? The logic of such 
trials is that most confounding variables are taken out in the wash, giving clean results. Where does the 
industry’s stream of good news come from?  
 
Publication and design bias 
Plainly, this bias may simply be another flavour of publication bias. The prevalence of publication bias 
in cognitive sciences has been carefully detailed and reviewed by Ioannidis, Munafò, Fusar-Poli, Nosek 
and David (2014), who noted that, in spite of a near-even split between negative and positive industry-
funded trials investigating the effect of antidepressants, the former are supressed and unpublished 
(Turner et al., 2008). In the case that these negative findings might be published, however, we would 
expect these studies to surface in journals well after positive findings (Misakian and Bero, 1998), 
affecting the rate at which we update our knowledge. 
 
However: this presupposes that all trials are seen through to the end. It may be more cost-effective to 
call a poor project to a halt if the initial results are shaky. In this way, publication bias may not explain 
everything, but design bias may. 
 
Fries and Krishnan (2004), observed in their assessment of American College of Rheumatology meeting 
abstracts that 100% of the total number of abstracts for RCTs of the study’s sponsor’s drug resulted in 
a positive outcome. In their discussion, they argue that the ceiling effect seen here could not be 
attributable to publication bias alone. Instead, they posit that design bias may be the most powerful 
explanation.  
 
Specifically, as a drug is screened through multiple phases of testing, its weaknesses and strengths are 
revealed to researchers within the industry. Trials could then be designed to both capitalise on strengths 
and shade weaknesses. Doing so is a violation of the principle of equipoise, where a drug’s efficacy – in 
comparison to a control – should always be uncertain, and therefore necessitate research. Djulbegovic 
et al. (2000) revealed that the pharmaceutical industry violates this principle where independent 
organisations do not. Coupled with the study’s finding of the industry’s preference to test a product 
against a placebo or no therapy (as opposed to an active or competing treatment) this suggests that 
industry studies are designed to be “safe”. 
 
Variable of interest 
Psychologists need to pay particular attention to the scale or test they use to demonstrate efficacy. This 
is certainly the case in drug trial literature, as multiple scales can be used to assess one aspect of disease; 
it would be wrong to assume that these are all equivalent. Indeed, this was the case in trials on donepezil; 
cognition was assessed by both the MMSE and the ADAS-cog, yet without any clear rationale behind 
each choice. On the one hand, each scale has its own strengths and weaknesses, but on the other they 
broadly assess the same construct; does the choice of scale really have a bearing on the outcome?  
 
An analysis of available data suggests that it does. We compared ADAS-Cog and MMSE as outcome 
measures using standardized mean difference (SMD) which allows one to assess outcome when 
measured with different tools. After separating trials based on their outcome measure, we see that the 
ADAS-cog is associated with a much greater SMD compared to placebo than the SMD associated with 
the MMSE, meaning that ADAS-Cog shows greater effects of the drug than the MMSE. Both scales 
ostensibly measure cognition, but clearly not to the same effect. Moreover: which scale should we trust?  
 
This difference may be explained by the fact the ADAS-cog has been criticized for being too easy 
(Cressey, 2012). If this is the case, donepezil participants assessed on this scale may always find 
themselves close to ceiling level despite exhibiting subtle declines that a different scale would reveal. In 
other words: donepezil groups may still be declining – just not at a rate the ADAS-cog is designed to 
detect.  
 
Thus, two scales of cognition, often used interchangeably, and considered equipoise in reviews and 
meta-analyses, do not necessarily present the same effect. It is noticeable that the drinking chocolate 
study from Desideri et al. (2012) observed a change in speed in executive tasks, but no difference in the 
MMSE (which, crucially, assesses neither executive function nor speed). The change in the former is 
still reported as “cognitive function”. Strictly, this is true, but it is disingenuous to use a broad term that 
could be misinterpreted so as to apply to a wider range of skills. Ultimately, our broad definitions give 
ample room for researchers to use and choose tasks that are falsely portrayed as tantamount, yet 
produce different results. The effect of interventions will vary accordingly. Psychologists should be 
aware of these potential biases. 
 
Data creativity 
In spite of careful planning, there is no guarantee that a trial will work. A failed experiment could be an 
expensive failure, both in terms of time and money. What is your resolve if a three-year, multi-centre 
trial did not pan out?   
 
If there are enough collected data or possible outcome variables, there is a good opportunity to find or 
massage the desired effect in spite of what is declared a priori. Antidepressant trials reviewed by Turner 
and colleagues (2008) demonstrated that some industry-funded studies failed to find a statistically 
significant effect on the primary outcome they had specified in the methods they submitted to the US 
Food and Drug Administration. Instead, a different result was promoted as the significant, primary 
finding, and the original variable of interest was shelved.  
 
Qualitatively, this has been examined in an unsettling historical case analysis from Cataldo, Bero and 
Malone (2010), which investigated correspondence between the tobacco industry and investigators of 
the Framingham Heart Study. The introduction of the Council for Tobacco Research – and its money – 
to the study came at the cost of the Framingham data, which would later be reinterpreted and reanalysed 
to conclude that there was no effect of tobacco smoke on coronary heart disease (CHD). Specifically, an 
analysis of these data stratified by age and ethnicity would suggest some individuals were naturally 
predisposed to CHD, and divert attention away from the hypothesis that tobacco was a cause. The latter 
position was pushed by the original investigators and supported by reference to overall mortality data. 
In the end, the same data produced two contrasting conclusions. 
 
Ignoring criticism 
Positive effects produced by the industry may be due to significant methodological shortcomings in 
spite of using the RCT method. In these cases, reviewers and critics need to identify these issues. The 
industry, however, has to listen.  
 
A failure to do so became clear when the health benefits of transcendental meditation (TM) programmes 
were held under scrutiny. Its use pointed towards possible positive effects on mental health and blood 
pressure. However, a series of meta-analyses reviewed these claims in turn. Firstly, Canter and Ernst 
(2003) observed a clear divide between studies that claimed a beneficial effect of TM on cognition and 
those that did not. Specifically, TM’s success was linked to inadequate control groups (echoing the 
findings of Chacko et al., 2014 and Djulbegovic et al., 2000). On TM’s link with blood pressure, Canter 
and Ernst (2004) argued that, in a field saturated by TM affiliated studies, even the most stringent RCT 
failed to adequately assess baseline measures and also account for differences between experimental 
groups, such as rates of medication. This was raised as a serious criticism and a source of bias in the TM 
literature.  
 
After these criticisms were published, Anderson, Liu and Kryscio (2008) produced an updated meta-
analysis of TM and blood pressure. This naturally contained the criticised studies analysed by Canter 
and Ernst four years previously. The authors plainly concluded that the quality of TM studies varied. 
However, given this range of quality their approach was to highlight the high quality studies, and ignore 
the fundamental problems raised by Canter and Ernst. The authors nonetheless concluded that TM was 
responsible for clinically meaningful changes in systolic and diastolic blood pressure. Unlike previous 
meta-analyses, this was funded by an unlimited gift from Dr. Howard Settle, who is responsible for 
personally funding the construction of TM centres in North America.  
 
Psychology’s role 
So: how do we get to the truth of a product’s effectiveness? We may be starting on poor footing as it is. 
Psychology is fraught with biases and possible confounding effects. For instance, even well-established 
phenomena in short term memory - such as the phonological similarity or word length effects – are 
affected by the strategies participants use (Logie et al. 1996). How many other possible variables could 
explain a part of a human’s cognition or behaviour? What if participants are anxious or if they are not 
familiar with the words we ask them to remember? At what point do we stop controlling for these 
variables?  
 
We cannot – and do not - address all confounds. Instead, we control for the bigger, broader variables 
like age, education or gender and work on the assumption that multiple measurements merge and 
overlap to reveal some identifiable construct or mechanism that can be generalised (Lilienfield, 2012), 
and rely on replications (as emphasised in The Psychologist, May 2012) to make sure our finding is not 
restricted to one place and time (as Manzi, 2010, would argue). The least we can do then, in addition to 
this, is to control for the bias of industry funding, especially if it is something that “researchers cannot 
stop” (Seife, 2012, p. 63). 
 
Such control has started to take place in Europe. This year, MEPs voted in favour of the Clinical Trials 
Regulation, which was created to ensure that trials are pre-registered before they are run, and that the 
results are clearly reported and explained in lay terms within a year of the study’s end. This takes away 
the likelihood of publication bias, design bias and post hoc massaging as detailed earlier. Pre-
registration may prove an effective tool also in cognitive science (Chambers, 2013; see discussion in The 
Psychologist, July 2013). 
 
However, the scientific community cannot coast on the new regulation alone. Researchers will still need 
to be relentlessly critical of industry-funded research. The ammunition closest to hand for a 
psychologist would be their knowledge of statistics and experimental design, but an education in 
psychometrics can define the overlap between an affected construct and the test used to assess it, cross-
examining the exact claim of industry-funded studies.  
 
Psychologists are also in a position to take on the industry with their own research.  
 
This year marks the 50th anniversary of the 1964 Surgeon General’s Report on Smoking and Health. To 
commemorate this event, the role of psychologists in the continued campaign for tobacco control was 
reviewed recently (De Angelis, 2014). Amongst other contributions, psychologists were responsible for 
developing population-wide smoking cessation interventions, such as telephone quitting lines, which 
are readily available as government funded amenities across the United States. Furthermore, related 
psychological interventions have been carefully developed to be sensitive to different populations so as 
to identify the exact relationships between groups and outcomes associated with their smoking. These 
efforts stand in contrast to the evidence surrounding nicotine patches, which is a generic treatment with 
an efficacy affected by industry-funding (Etter, Burri & Stapleton, 2007).  
 
Conclusions  
Funding sources will continue to bias scientific research. The move towards trial registration will take 
the spin off industry-funded research, but there is still a need for diligence. As this bias perseveres, 
researchers need to remain critical and forge a way around this bias or, at least, flag it at every instance.  
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